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ABSTRACT 
This paper examines the effects of ignored inefficiencies on the reliability of sustainability 
indicators and effectiveness of investment in resource-based economies. A model of a social 
planner does not include some phenomena that may influence the path of utility. These 
unspecified phenomena may cause inefficiency of the economy. In order to simulate this natural 
discrepancy between theory and real life, this study assumes that the planner applies the 
policies developed for an efficient (undistorted) model, whereas the real economy is distorted by 
some neglected effects that can influence utility, production, the balance equation, and the 
dynamics of the natural reserve. The resulting inefficiency affects the dependence of current 
utility change on investment. The analysis shows that, for sustainability in the presence of 
inefficiency, first, changes in institutions and in the patterns of resource extraction may become 
more important than investments; and secondly, it is preferable to underextract a natural 
resource under uncertainties in production possibilities and damages from economic activities. 
An inadequate accounting system, misestimated production possibilities, and insecure property 
rights are considered as examples of disregarded inefficiencies. 
 
Keywords   Dynamic inefficiency · Investment · Natural resource · Sustainability 
                                                        
† Abbreviations:  CUC – Current utility change; GI – Genuine investment; HR – Hotelling rule; DHS – 
Dasgupta-Heal-Solow 
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1. Introduction 
Sustainability of real economies is always evaluated in the presence of uncertainties in 
future production possibilities and in various distortions such as institutional imperfections, 
economic wastefulness, and damages from economic activities to utility and production. These 
uncertainties lead to errors in the decisions of a social planner and cause deviations from an 
efficient and optimal path of economic development. Due to imperfections in information and 
institutions, inefficiencies always exist in real economies,1 and it is important to learn how they 
may affect the reliability of sustainability indicators and sustainability policies developed for 
simplified models. 
The literature on sustainability evaluation of resource-based economies offers an 
expression, called genuine (net) saving or genuine investment (GI), which is a weighted sum of 
changes in capital assets that are essential for sustainability. GI is considered sometimes as an 
indicator of sustainable development. The assets in GI include various forms of human, man-
made, and natural capital. The coefficients (weights), multiplied by the changes in these assets, 
are called the accounting or shadow prices. These prices show how a unit of change in the 
corresponding asset affects a value that is used to measure sustainability. There are both 
theoretical and practical difficulties in providing such a definition of this value that can be used as 
a reliable practical indicator of sustainability of a real economy. These difficulties are connected 
mostly with the uncertainties in the future paths of the economy and discussed, e. g., in Solow 
(1993), Dasgupta and Mäler (2000), Asheim et al. (2003), Martinet (2007), and Cairns (2008).2 
Despite all the difficulties, the studies of sustainability of a resource economy provide a number 
                                                        
1 “In the real world environmental externalities are not always internalised. This is one of many causes that 
prevent market economies from being fully efficient” (Asheim et al., 2003). See also Stiglitz (1991). 
2 See also the reviews in the Handbook of Environmental Accounting (2010) edited by T. Aronsson and 
K.-G. Löfgren. 
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of models, methods of solution and interesting insights on the behaviour of this economy under 
various conditions. 
The current paper extends the existing literature by offering an approach for estimating 
the (possible) effects of inefficiencies that result from ignoring by a planner some phenomena 
that are essential for the path of utility. These phenomena are called “distortions” in the paper 
because they are not included into a simplified model. Distortions lead to inefficiencies if and only 
if a planner, maximizing social welfare, does not take them into account. Hence, technically, in 
this paper, inefficient economy arises from optimization under imperfections (Lemma 1).  
In order to use this approach in practice, some specific forms of distortions should be 
assumed. Then various scenarios of economic development will show possible damages to utility 
from ignoring these distortions. This approach is different from the regular construction of 
optimistic-pessimistic scenarios and comparison of the paths of development indicators 
assuming that all essential for these indicators phenomena are included into the model.  
The paper shows how a natural discrepancy between a model and real life results in 
inefficiency and, in some cases, unsustainability of the economy. Moreover, in an inefficient 
unsustainable economy, a feasible investment providing a non-declining path of utility may not 
exist. In this case, the inefficiency must be reduced first, e. g., by the correction of the institutions 
or the accounting system.  
The idea of developing sustainability indicators stems from the result of Hartwick (1977). 
The “invest resource rent” rule (zero GI or Hartwick rule) addresses the problem formulated in 
Solow (1974) for the Dasgupta-Heal-Solow (DHS)3 model of a maximin-optimal resource-based 
economy satisfying the standard Hotelling rule (HR) as a necessary condition of dynamic 
efficiency. For this model, zero GI with resource depletion measured in competitive prices leads 
                                                        
3 This model with the Cobb-Douglas production function, which includes a nonrenewable resource as a 
factor, was developed in the works of Dasgupta and Heal (1974) and Solow (1974). 
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to constant per capita consumption over time. Dixit et al. (1980) extended the Hartwick rule by 
showing that, for a more general production function in a competitive economy with multiple 
assets, GI that is zero over time in present competitive prices4 is a necessary and sufficient 
condition for a constant path of utility at maximum value. Dasgupta and Heal (1979, pp. 303-
306), Hamilton and Hartwick (2005), and Hamilton et al. (2006) analyzed the link between GI in 
current prices and current change in per capita consumption. Hamilton and Withagen (2007) 
derived the result of Dixit et al. (1980), as well as the result of Hamilton and Hartwick (2005), in a 
more general setting (for multiple consumption good and internalized externalities), showing that 
instantaneous utility increases if and only if GI decreases in present prices. 
Various forms of the indicator GI developed for efficient economies have been used for 
practical evaluations of sustainability. For example, Pearce and Atkinson (1993) offered a simple 
indicator of weak sustainability5 based on the assertion that “an economy is sustainable if it saves 
more than the combined depreciation on the two forms of capital” (man-made and natural). A 
variant of this indicator, modified for open economies, has been developed in Proops et al. 
(1999). These indicators were used in both papers to classify a number of countries into 
sustainable and unsustainable. Hamilton and Clemens (1999) developed a theory of genuine 
saving by adding the investment in human capital to traditional net savings and subtracting the 
value of resource depletion and environmental damage. The value of genuine saving was used 
as an indicator of sustainability for a wide range of developing countries. A review of empirical 
work on sustainability evaluation can be found in Hamilton (2010). As Hamilton and Hartwick 
(2005) noted, “the magnitude of ‘net investment’ or ‘genuine savings’ has become a central focus 
in the measurement of the sustainability of an economy.” 
                                                        
4 Constant investment in present prices means that investment in current prices is growing with the rate of 
discount. 
5 Weak sustainability of growth (development) is defined in Pezzey (1992) as non-decreasing per capita 
consumption (utility). 
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While most of the theoretical results above were obtained for optimal or competitive 
economies, Dasgupta and Mäler (2000) and Arrow et al. (2003), developing a theory of 
sustainable resource use in imperfect economies, showed that the shadow price of a natural 
resource can be considerably higher than the market price, implying that the investment of the 
market resource rent and even the entire marked-valued output into man-made capital can be 
insufficient to compensate for damages caused by the resource extraction.6 In other words, GI in 
shadow prices may be negative despite any effort in saving, suggesting that, for some inefficient 
economies, correction of institutions (e. g., property rights) leading to a more conservative 
resource policy is a prerequisite of sustainability.  
Unfortunately, accurate shadow prices are not observable in real economies, in particular 
because of uncertainties in population growth, damages from economic activities, and future 
production possibilities (resource reserves estimates and rates of technical change). These 
uncertainties usually are dealt with by stochastic models in theory and optimistic-pessimistic 
scenarios in practice. Both approaches result in errors and, therefore, in inefficiencies. Asheim 
(2010), showing that the value of GI “cannot serve as a reliable indicator of sustainability,” noted 
also that inefficiency may further loosen the link between GI and sustainability. 
This paper shows how inefficiency loosens the link between GI and sustainability. 
Proposition 1 provides the dependence between “undistorted” GI, which was developed for an 
efficient economy, and current utility change (CUC) in an economy with inefficiencies. This result 
extends Proposition 1 of Hamilton and Hartwick (2005), and shows that CUC may be determined 
only by the influence of inefficiency when this influence is not close to zero. 
                                                        
6 In real economies, the standard HR does not hold (e. g., Gaudet, 2007), implying deviations from the 
competitive efficient extraction path. Bazhanov (2007, 2008) showed that in the DHS economy under a 
modified HR and zero GI, the path of consumption may be either decreasing to zero or infinitely increasing 
depending on the path of extraction.  
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The examples of distortions (Section 3) include (i) misestimated dynamics of the natural 
resource stock that may lead either to a sustainable but dynamically inefficient or unsustainable 
economy; (ii) inadequate accounting system that ignores the damages from the resource use to 
utility and production yielding inefficiency and unsustainability; and (iii) insecure property rights 
that also cause inefficiency and unsustainability, unless corrected by institutional reforms. 
This study shows that, for sustainability, it is preferable to underestimate future production 
possibilities and overestimate damages since this policy of extra caution can reduce irreversible 
losses. Of course, this policy may lead to dynamic inefficiency caused by an overly conservative 
resource policy, but with updates in knowledge, the policy can be corrected, and the economy 
can be asymptotically efficient. This study extends also (for general inefficiency) the effect shown 
by van der Ploeg (2011) that insecure property rights require more effort in investment to 
maintain constant per capita consumption. Corollary 2 adds, in particular, that underestimation of 
future production possibilities requires less investment than in the “undistorted” case. 
Besides disregarded inefficiencies, the study shows how sustainability evaluation may 
depend on the specification of the same effects in the model and on the form of the indicator 
(Section 4). An indicator linked to CUC may be, by construction, insensitive to the changes in the 
long-term ability of an economy to maintain non-declining utility.7 On the other hand, an indicator 
of long-term sustainability, also by construction, may be insensitive to CUC, also leading to 
unsustainability at the initial point. Therefore, various indicators may complement each other. 
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the approach to modelling a 
dynamically inefficient “distorted” economy and derives the main theoretical results; Section 3 
illustrates these results with the examples of various types of inefficient economies; Section 4 
                                                        
7 Besides this paper, see, e.g., Asheim et al. (2003), Martinet (2007), and Cairns (2008). 
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shows the dependence of sustainability evaluation on the specification of the model and the form 
of indicator; and Section 5 concludes. 
2. Investment and growth in inefficient economy 
In order to define a distorted economy, it is instructive to introduce first a “perfect” or 
undistorted optimizing economy. Following Hamilton and Hartwick (2005, p. 618), assume that 
the economy is closed, time t  is continuous, consumption is aggregated into a single good ,C  
labour is fixed, so that output ),(=)( RKFtQ  depends on man-made capital )(tK  and the 
resource flow ),(-=)( tStR   where )(tS  is the current resource stock ( dtdSS /=: ). The 
technology is stationary ( F  does not depend explicitly on t ). 
A number of studies, which results were used for practical evaluation of sustainability, 
assume that the economy satisfies the following: 
 resource productiveness: ),( RKF  is a regular production function that (a) denotes the 
maximum output for the given K  and ,R  and (b) satisfies the Inada conditions, in particular 
0>RF , where ;∂/∂=: RFFR  
  static efficiency: output Q  equals ),( RKF 8 
 non-wastefulness: the balance equation holds: ,-),(=+ KδRKFKC   where K  is 
investment and Kδ  with constδ =  is capital decay; 
 dynamic efficiency: the standard HR 
rFF RR = 9        (1) 
holds as a necessary condition of dynamic efficiency; 
                                                        
8 Conventionally, efficiency is defined via the Pareto-optimality. Some studies, e. g. Hurwicz (1960), called 
this notion non-wastefulness. 
9 Here, δ(t)Ftr K -=:)(  is the competitive interest rate. 
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 optimality: the economy (a planner) maximizes a (social) welfare function by choosing the 
paths of K  and R , or the economy is competitive. 
In the real world, however, the resource use can be 
 non-productive ( 0=RF ) or counter-productive ( 0<RF );10 
 productive, but static-inefficient ( ),(< RKFQ ); 
 productive, static-efficient, but wasteful ( KδRKFKC -),(<+  ); 
 productive, static-efficient, non-wasteful, but dynamically inefficient; 
 productive, non-wasteful, efficient, but not optimal or under imperfect competition. 
This paper assumes that there are distortions in the economy, which are represented by 
vector .D  The distortions may include imperfections, externalities, and any effects (including 
favourable for sustainability) that cause deviation of the intertemporal efficiency condition for the 
ratio RR FF  from the standard HR (1).11 In resource economies, D  may depend on the 
extracted amount of the resource when this extraction or the resource use causes irreversible 
losses to the environment, human health, and even production itself, e. g., as a result of oil spills 
or climate change due to the burning of fossil fuels. In some cases, the extracted amount may 
depend on institutional imperfections, e. g., insecure property rights. D  may depend also on ,R  
e. g., when damage includes opportunity cost (Gaudet et al., 2006), or when damage is partly 
reversible. Then the analysis becomes more complicated, which, however, does not alter the 
main approach and conclusions of the paper. 
The main goal of the study below is to show how distortions modify intertemporal 
efficiency condition (1), and how inefficiencies, resulting from ignoring these distortions, affect the 
efficacy of investment policies. A particular goal is to show that, under large inefficiencies, 
                                                        
10 The resource use is counter-productive when the decline in the natural resource stock results in the 
decline of output, e. g., as a result of a wildfire or oil spill. 
11 A review of studies with the modified HR is, e. g., in Gaudet (2007). 
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increasing investments in man-made or human capital may not help to restore sustainability and 
even may be harmful, e. g., to poor countries.12 To illustrate the claims of this study, it is enough 
to assume that the components of D  depend on the extracted amount )(tX  (or on the 
remaining stock )(tS )13 or on the parameters that express distorted institutions. 
In this paper, D  has four components that are the distortions in 
production: ),,,(= 1DRKFF  (2) 
social utility: ),,(= 2DCUU  (3) 
the balance equation: ,---),,(= 31 DKδCDRKFK  (4) 
the dynamics of the stock: .+-= 4DRS  (5) 
Following the above, assume that 4D  either depends on )(tS  or on the parameters that do not 
depend on time explicitly, and }3,2,1{∈))],(([= itSXDD ii  depend on the extracted amount, 
which, by (5), is .)]([+)(-=)(=)( ∫∫ 0 400
tt
ξdξSDtSSξdξRtX  Distortions 1D  and 2D  may 
represent irreversible damages caused by climate change resulted from the burning of fossil 
fuels, e.g., in the form 2]1+)([ 1
θtXθ , where 21,θθ – parameters14; 3D  may stand for the 
growing cost of extraction ( 0>∂∂ 3 XD  – the best-quality stock extracted first). As to 4D , 
assume that this distortion is such that 
(a) 0=
0=)(4 tS
D  (no resource reserve – no distortion); 
(b) 00 4 -)(≥)]([∫ StSξdξSD
t
 (the productive extraction )(tX  is nonnegative). 
                                                        
12 See also Cairns (2008). 
13 If D  depends on the non-extracted resource, e.g., the stock has an amenity value (D’Autume, Schubert, 
2008), then, expressing this value in terms of utility, the problem can be reformulated by introducing the 
damage from the resource extraction. The latter approach may be more precise, since the uncertainty in 
the extracted stock is less than in the remaining. 
14 See Bazhanov (2012) and Stollery (1998). 
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4D  may take the form ),(=4 tSδD S  where negative Sδ  may stand for the rate of non-
productive depreciation of the stock ),(tS  e. g., in the cases of wildfires or leakage of fresh 
water. Positive Sδ  may reflect explorations for a non-renewable resource, or may be the rate of 
natural appreciation of ),(tS  e. g., in fishery or forestry. In the former case, for a plausible ,Sδ  
the stock )(tS  must be monotonically decreasing starting from some 0≥t  (i.e., RD ≤4  for 
any tt >  with RD =4  only for 0== RS ). Hence, 
.
∂
)]([∂
+1-=
∂
∂
∫0
4 ξd
S
ξSD
S
X t
 
Note that 1-=∂/∂ SX  implies SDXD ii ∂/∂-=∂/∂ . These equalities hold if and only 
if 0=
∂
)]([∂
∫0
4 ξd
S
ξSDt
, e. g., for a non-renewable resource with no explorations and non-
productive losses ( 0≡4D ), or for 4D  that does not depend on S  and results only in a 
redistribution of the resource among generations (e.g., for imperfect institutions). Note also that, 
for any ,0≥t  0<∂/∂ SX  if 0>R  and .0<S  
In the following lemma, IΨ  is a deviation of RR FF /  from a dynamically efficient path. 
Lemma 1. In economy (2)-(5), 
),(+)(= tτtvFF RR        (6) 
where ,-=:)( δFtv K 15 )(tτ 16 SDtτ I ∂/∂-Ψ=:)]([= 4D  
 ,∂/∂}/]∂/∂-∂/∂+∂/∂)/[({- 312 12 SXFXDXDFXDUU RDCD   (7) 
and 0=ΨI  if the economy is dynamically efficient. 
                                                        
15 )(tv  is the market interest rate only with no distortion. 
16 )(tτ  is the additive HR modifier or the influence of .D  This influence can be expressed in a 
multiplicative form: [ ] ,= RR FηvF D  where [ ] [ ] ./+1=: vτη DD  With no distortion, .0=τ  
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Proof is in Appendix 1. 
Corollary 1. If, under the conditions of Lemma 1, 4D  does not depend on S , then 
./]∂/∂-∂/∂+∂/∂)/[(-Ψ=)( 312 12 RDCDI FSDSDFSDUUtτ  
In this framework, dynamic efficiency is a relative notion. The planner’s optimal path may 
be dynamically inefficient with respect to a first-best solution, e. g., because the planner 
underestimates future production possibilities and considers the first-best path as infeasible 
(Section 3.1). The planner’s path may also be inefficient when the planner ignores some effects 
while estimating social progress. In the latter case, the planner may even consider the first-best 
path as inefficient due to the difference between the units of measure for utility in the planner’s 
and the first-best solutions (Section 3.2). 
Inefficiency IΨ  depends on D  when a simplified model for economy (2)-(5) results in 
,0=τ  ignoring the distortions. For example, SDI ∂/∂=Ψ 4  when a planner misestimates the 
changes in the proven resource stock (Section 3.1). IΨ  depends on 1D  and 2D  when the 
planner ignores the damages from the resource extraction (Section 3.2). In some cases, 
however, IΨ  may not depend on ,D  and instead, both IΨ  and D  may be determined by the 
same phenomena, e. g., imperfect institutions (Section 3.3). 
Genuine investment (GI) defined in Hamilton and Hartwick (2005) is 
),()(+)(=:)( tFtStKtG R       (8) 
which is )()(-)( tFtRtK R  without distortions. This measure includes not only the investment 
into man-made capital K  but the value of the extracted natural resource S  estimated in the 
marginal resource productivity ,RF  which, with no distortion, coincides with competitive price. 
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In the general case, GI is defined as ∑ )(=:)(
i ii
tKptG   where iK  are various forms of 
man-made (including human and intangible) and natural capital, and ip  are the shadow prices 
equal to the marginal change in social welfare V  resulting from a change in :iK  
ii KVp ∂/∂=:  (Arrow et al. 2003).17 By construction, G  must coincide with the change in 
social welfare resulting from the combination of investments to (or extractions from) all essential 
for V  assets at the current moment: ( )∑ ∂/∂=),,( 21 i ii KKVKKV   (if V  does not depend 
on time explicitly).18 Then, if V  reflects the ability of the economy to maintain non-declining 
utility, the indicator GI shows the change in sustainability of the economy. 
As was mentioned above, sustainability of real economies is always evaluated under 
imperfections including imperfections in knowledge and in models that are used for this 
evaluation. Therefore, in practical sustainability evaluation, a model welfare function and the 
correspondent indicator GI never include all the factors that will affect the long-term path of utility 
in the real economy. In order to examine the effect of this discrepancy, this study considers 
indicator GI in the form of (8), which corresponds to the “undistorted” economy. 
Due to the distortion ,2D  utility may be decreasing in time while consumption is growing; 
therefore, consumption cannot always be a proxy for utility as a measure of well-being (see, e. g., 
Section 3.2). Hence, the proposition below establishes the link between G  and ,U  which 
includes the link between G  and C  as a special case. 
                                                        
17 For example, under the utilitarian criterion, [ ] ,)(),(),(=)( ∫
∞
21t
dssπsKsKUtV   where π  is a 
discount factor, and, under the maximin, [ ],),(),(=)( 21* tKtKUtV  where *U  is the maximum level of 
utility that can be maintained forever given the current assets .),(),( 21 tKtK  
18 If social welfare depends on exogenous processes such as population growth or technical change, the 
time derivative is ( ) .∂/∂+∂/∂=),,,( ∑21 i ii KKVtVKKtV   
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Proposition 1. Current utility change (CUC) in distorted economy (2)-(5) is 
,Ψ+)/-(= 000 UCUGGGvU        (9) 
where 0G  is the GI indicator for the undistorted economy, and 
 )]∂/∂+1)(/--(+)∂/∂-Ψ([-=:Ψ
21 2134 SXUUDFDDSDRFU CDDIRCU
  
is the influence of the inadequate indicator 0G  and the dynamic inefficiency IΨ . 
Proof is in Appendix 2. 
When an economy is efficient ( 0=ΨI ), and GI is measured in competitive prices (with 
internalized externalities and ,≠ 0GG  implying 0=ΨU ), formula (9) can be obtained from the 
results of Dixit et al. (1980) or Hamilton and Withagen (2007) (see the proof). With no distortion, 
Eq. (9) coincides with the result of Hamilton and Hartwick (2005). In the general case, Eq. (9) 
shows that investment (8) can indeed determine U  if UΨ  is relatively small. However, U  can 
be also completely determined by UΨ  when the term CGUGGv )/-(   is close to zero. 
Of course, sharp changes in G  can determine an instant sign of U  despite the large 
values of UΨ . Formula (9) shows that if there is a ,= tt  such that )(Ψ t  has a large positive 
(negative) value, )(tU  can be negative (positive) if )(tG  is negative (positive) and )(/)( tGtG  
has a large positive (negative) value. However, these cases are not relevant to sustainability due 
to the boundedness of investments, whereas distortions in general are less restricted. The 
boundedness of investment implies that the larger is UΨ , the shorter is the period of time when 
these cases are possible. Therefore, neglecting the short-run oscillations, assume, for 
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determinateness, that ,∞<</ vGG 19 and the current investment K  is bounded by the 
current output .Q  Then a feasible investment can be defined as follows. 
Definition 1. Investment )()(=)( tQtwtK  is feasible if )1,0(∈)(tw  and  vGG </  
for any .0≥t  
Eq. (9) is essentially simplified if 0≡∂/∂ 4 SD  while retaining the dependence of CUC 
on the interplay between investment and inefficiency. The following corollary uses this case to 
illustrate (I) how the sign of CUC ( 0<
>U ) depends on the values of investment ( G  or w ) and 
inefficiency ( IΨ  or UΨ ); and (II) that investment K  can influence the sign of CUC if and only if 
inefficiency is sufficiently small.  
Corollary 2. If 4D  does not depend on S , Eq. (9) implies that 
(I) for a feasible investment K , 0<
>U  if and only if 
G <
>  )-/(Ψ /GGvRF IR    or )],-/(Ψ+1][/[<
> /GGvQRFw IR   or (10) 
UΨ <
>  ( ) CGUGGv /--   or  
IΨ >
<  .)1-)/()(/-( RRFKGGv   (11) 
(II) a feasible investment can change the sign of U if and only if  
( ) </-- GGv  IΨ ).1-)/()(/-(< RRFQGGv   (12) 
When ,0=ΨI  condition (10) yields the Hartwick rule. The result of van der Ploeg (2011) 
can be obtained for βαRKRKFQ =),(=  and ,/)1-(=Ψ * KNξI  where N  is the number of 
the owners of the common resource and 0>*ξ  is the coefficient of violation of property rights. 
Then condition (10) is [ ].)/--/()1-(+1 *<> QKQKδQαNξβw   For 0=δ  and under 
                                                        
19 The analysis can be easily complemented with the case where .≥/ vGG  
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requirement ,0=Q  it becomes [ ],)/()1-(+1= * QαNξβw  yielding the result of van der 
Ploeg. Condition (10) also shows that if 0<ΨI  (e.g., underestimated production possibilities), 
the growth of utility can be achieved with less investment than in the Hartwick rule. 
The following examples show that, under Corollary 2, the impact of inefficiency on the 
efficacy of investment depends on the level of output and the share of the resource rent in output. 
Assume that 0=4D , ,06.0=v  and 03.0=/GG  at .0≥t  
(a) High-output resource-independent economy. Let 101=)(tQ  and 1=)()( tFtR R  
(the output of the resource sector is relatively small). Then the investment K  can change the 
sign of )(tU  if and only if .3<Ψ<03.0- I  
(b) Low-output resource-dependent economy. For 11=)(tQ  and ,10=)()( tFtR R  
investment can affect the sign of )(tU  if and only if .003.0<Ψ<03.0- I  
It is intuitive that a high-output economy has more opportunities in investment than a low-
output one, and so the range for IΨ , in which investment is able to affect the sign of U , is 
larger in case (a) than in case (b). Another difference between these two cases is that investment 
in case (a) can change the sign of U  mostly when IΨ  affects U  negatively (positive IΨ  
reduces U ). This asymmetry is inverted in case (b). 
The boundedness of investments implies that if 0≡∂/∂ 4 SD , the current states of 
economies may be classified into the following types depending on the roles of investment and 
institutional changes in the current change of utility given the level of inefficiency IΨ . 
(A) :)1-)/()(/-(≥ΨI RRFQGGv   utility declines regardless of investment; non-negative 
values of U  can be obtained only by reduction of the inefficiency. 
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(B) :)1-)/()(/-(<Ψ<0 I RRFQGGv   utility growth can be achieved by investment 
policy alone; the optimal saving rate is higher than under 0=ΨU  (by the second inequality in 
(10)) in order to compensate not only for the shrinking natural capital but for the negative effect of 
inefficiency. Without a policy reducing IΨ , the level of utility may be lower than under .0=ΨU  
(C) ( ) :0<Ψ</-- IGGv   utility growth can be achieved by investment policy alone; the 
optimal saving rate may be lower than under 0=ΨU  due to a positive effect from ;ΨI  decline 
in utility is still possible when .0<)-/(Ψ< I /GGvRFG R   
(D) ( ):/--<ΨI GGv   utility grows regardless of investment; investment policy is 
important as a determinant of the level of utility along the growing path (Bazhanov 2008). 
Types C and D may result from the underestimation of future production possibilities 
(Section 3.1). 
Condition (9) shows that, for ,0<ΨU  the minimum investment G  that provides non-
declining utility may be essentially higher than zero. The next section illustrates that a feasible 
value of ,G  guaranteeing ,0≥U  may not exist. 
3. Dynamic inefficiency and sustainability: examples 
In the examples below, 0ΨI  denotes a deviation of the ratio RR FF /  along the planner’s 
optimal path from a first-best path and *ΨI  – a deviation of this ratio along the first-best path from 
the planner’s path ( 0* Ψ-=Ψ II ). For succinctness, the planner’s optimal paths and the models 
that do not take into account some of the distortions are called below “undistorted.” 
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3.1. Misestimating the resource stock 
Assume that ,4D  which may be either positive or negative, is the only distortion in 
economy (2)-(5). A planner ignores 4D  and works with the undistorted model. By Lemma 1, 
SDI ∂/∂=Ψ 4  and the claim of Proposition 1 coincides with the efficient case since 0=ΨU :20 
.)/-(= 000 GGGvC   
Hence, misestimations of S  alone do not affect CUC. This fact, however, does not imply neither 
efficiency nor sustainability. Indeed, if 0>4D  (the stock is underestimated) and a sustainable 
path is feasible, the planner can implement it with the same policy 0G  without additional reserve. 
Inefficiency can be shown, e. g., when the planner follows a constant-consumption path. As is 
known from theory, a higher resource stock results in a higher optimal level of constant 
consumption. Therefore, an efficient planner recalculates the optimal path )(* tC  with the 
updates in the stock, yielding a piecewise-constant path with growing levels. Hence, )(* tC  will 
be Pareto-superior to the continuous path )0(≡)( CtC . 
If 0<4D  is ignored, the actual reserve is 0
∞
0 40
<)]([+∫ SξdξSDS  (overestimated 
stock) and there exists such 0>T  that 0=)(tS  for any ,≥Tt  yielding inefficiency and 
collapse regardless of 0G , e. g., for the DHS economy (Asheim et al., 2003, p. 138). 
In this section, a discrepancy between theory and real life results either in a sustainable 
but inefficient, or in unsustainable path when 0>4D  or 0<4D . Inefficiency in the former case 
can be reduced only by stimulating extraction when the planner updates reserve estimates. This 
                                                        
20 Utility is not distorted here ( 0=
2DU ); hence, formula (9) becomes 
000 )/-(= GGGvC   since 
22+= DUCUU DC
  and .0=/Ψ CU U  
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adjustment can result in sustainable and asymptotically efficient economy. Overestimated stock 
leads to unsustainability with a possible collapse of the economy if the resource is essential. 
3.2. Inadequate accounting system 
Assume that only production and social utility are negatively affected by the damage 
21 == DDD  caused by a stock externality ( 0<  ,0<  ,0>-= DDSX FUDD , 0>CU ) 
resulted, e. g., from irreversible climate change due to the burning of fossil fuels.21 If a planner 
uses an accounting system that disregards the damage, then, according to Corollary 1, the 
planner’s paths are dynamically inefficient with .0>/)/+(-=Ψ0 RSCDDI FDUUF  The 
planner’s problem reduces to the Solow (1974) - Hartwick (1977) case, where, under the 
maximin criterion, the path of extraction starts from a higher level than in the efficient case,22 and 
the economy follows a constant-consumption path (due to 0=G ) with a higher level than the 
initial level of the efficient path, which is measured in utility units. Since the planner assumes that 
,0== DD FU  formula (9) becomes .)/-(= 000 GGGvC   
In reality, however, the change in well-being is23 
,)+(+)/-(= 000 DUUFUGGGvU DCDC   (13) 
which is negative for the planner’s paths of investment and extraction ( 0=0G ) since 
.0<)+( DUUF DCD   The investment G  that provides 0>U  does not exist here when the 
damage is large, namely, when .0<]-)-([-<)+( CRDCD UGRFQvDUUF   Hence, the 
undistorted policies result in inefficiency and unsustainability of this economy. 
                                                        
21 See, e. g., Stollery (1998). 
22 When damage affects only production, Stollery (1998, p. 735) showed that the optimal extraction starts 
from a lower initial level and declines slower than in the case with no damage. The same result for a 
quasiarithmetic damage in utility was obtained in Bazhanov (2012, formula (33), Fig. 4) and for an 
exponential damage – in D’Autume et al. (2010). 
23 Eq. (13) results from Eq. (9) using the expression for 0ΨI  and the fact that SRDD -=  when .0=4D  
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A non-declining path of the true quality of life (utility) can be achieved in this example only 
when the planner recognizes the damages and reconsiders the measure of progress in the 
society.24 This done, the planner, situated in the Solow-Hartwick case, can switch to a 
sustainable and first-best optimal path by changing the resource policy alone, namely, by 
reducing extraction, while the investment rule remains the same.25 
3.3. Insecure property rights 
This section illustrates the case when inefficiency does not depend on D  and instead, 
both IΨ  and D  are determined by the same phenomenon – imperfect institutions. Following 
Arrow et al. (2003, p. 664), assume that the owner i  ;...1=( Ni  )2≥N  extracts a liquid 
resource from a pool with the stock .iS  All N  owners are identical, non-cooperative, and the 
pools are separated by porous barriers. The resource diffuses from larger pools to smaller ones 
with the same rate .0>λ 26 The depletion equations are 
,1=,-)-(= ∑
≠
NiRSSλS
ij iiji
  
where )(= tRR ii  is the owner s'i  rate of extraction at the moment t .  
As is shown in Arrow et al. (2003), maximization of the each owner’s payoff 
∫
∞
0
-)]([ dtetRU tρi  with )1-(--=)( ηii RRU , where ,1>η  yields Eq. (6) with =Ψ= Iτ  
0>)1-( λN  (social efficiency requires 1=N ). The distorted by the inefficiency path of 
extraction is ∑
1=
)(=)(~
N
i i
tRtR  ηtρI IeSηρ
/)Ψ+(
0]/)Ψ+[(=
-  with a higher initial rate )0(~R  
                                                        
24 A review on the theory of social accounting is in Aronsson and Löfgren (2010). A practical illustration of 
the changes in the measure of social progress is the development of the Integrated Environmental and 
Economic Accounting, which was first offered as a handbook on environmental accounting in UN (1993) 
and eventually became a legal base in EU (2011). 
25 Stollery (1998) showed that the Hartwick rule ( 0=G ) is still optimal in this economy. 
26 No barriers corresponds to .∞→λ  
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and faster decline )0(~R  than for the efficient path .]/[=)( /-0 ηtρeSηρtR  Hence, the distorted 
equation for the reserve is ,+-= 4DRS  where RRD
~-=4 . In this example, neither 4D  
depends on ),(tS  nor IΨ  depends on .4D  Both these deviations result from imperfect 
institutions, expressed in 2≥N  and .0>λ  
For illustration, assume that 06.0=v  and .04.0-=/GG  By Corollary 2, a feasible 
investment K  can change the sign of U  if and only if .0>]1-)(/[1.0<)1-( RRFQλN  If this 
condition is not satisfied, only institutional changes can prevent decline in utility. Investment 
provides non-decreasing utility here if and only if 
0>)1-(10≥ RRFλNG  or ),/](1+)1-(10[≥ QRFλNw R  
which may be very restrictive for .1>N  Consider two cases. 
(a) High-output resource-independent economy ( 1=;101= RRFQ ). In this case, K  can 
change the sign of U  if and only if ,10<)1-( λN  which means, e. g., that, for 1=λ  and any 
K , utility decreases if .10>N  Let .5=N  Then the saving rate, compensating for the 
shrinking resource and the inefficiency, should be no less than 101/41=minw  (or 
101/40≥/QG ), whereas with no distortion, utility increases for any 101/1>w  (or 0>G ). 
(b) Low-output resource-dependent economy ( 10=;11= RRFQ ). K  can change the 
sign of U  if and only if ;01.0<)1-( λN  e. g., for 01.0≥λ  and ,2≥N  utility decreases 
regardless of any feasible K . For 009.0=λ  and ,2=N  non-decreasing utility is possible 
when almost all output is being invested: .11/9.10≥w  Although, for this economy, even with 
1=N , the saving rate yielding constant utility is very high, namely, .91.0≈/=min QRFw R  
The use of “undistorted” policy leads in this example to inefficiency and unsustainability; 
moreover, a feasible investment compensating for the inefficiency and providing non-decreasing 
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utility may not exist. Therefore, recommendations to increase investments, implied by an 
undistorted model, may cause a drop in current utility below a subsistence minimum without 
reaching sustainability. This outcome implies that institutions must be corrected first in order to 
reduce inefficiency and only secondly the policies for the undistorted model can be applied. 
Of course, a model that takes into account all the essential factors for utility does not 
necessarily imply a low level of inefficiency in practice. This level depends on the specifications 
of the factors, and practical sustainability requires moderately-pessimistic assumptions.27 
4. A form of indicator and sustainability 
As is known, the gap between sustainability evaluation and actual sustainability depends 
not only on disregarded inefficiencies. This section shows how sustainability evaluation may 
depend on the form of the indicator and on the specification of the same effects in the model. 
Indicator GI that shows CUC may not reflect the change in the ability of an economy to 
maintain non-decreasing utility over time. For example, if ),(= RKFQ βαRK= , indicator (8) 
expressed as a share of GDP takes the form ,-=/ βwQG  where w  is the rate of investment 
( wQK = ). If utility monotonically increases with consumption, then, for ,> βα  an economic 
program with non-decreasing utility exists at 0= tt  if and only if the level of potential 
sustainability 
0t=t∞
/QG  
0
)](/[= 0 t=tβαQSβKRw --  is non-negative (Bazhanov 2011).
28 In 
this form of the indicator GI, the resource price shows the change in the maximum level of 
consumption that can be maintained forever, while the resource stock changes by one unit.  
                                                        
27 Bazhanov (2011) showed that a model of IMF with oil and financial assets as perfect substitutes allows 
for sustainable development for oil-extracting countries, while the same oil extracting scenarios result in 
collapse for DHS model using Russian data. 
28 If α  and β  are to be determined by calibration (e. g., Bazhanov 2011, Section 3), a more convenient 
form of this indicator is .)/()/(=/
0=0∞ tt
QSKRwββαQG --  This expression is always negative when 
,< βα  i.e., a non-decreasing path of consumption does not exist. 
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Hence, this economy is potentially sustainable at 0= tt  (a program with non-decreasing 
utility exists)29 if and only if ,]/[)-(≤/)(
0
00 t=t
KββαwQStR  which means that potential 
sustainability can be achieved by a change in resource policy only, regardless of the value of 
0=
/
tt
QG  and the sign of ).( 0tC  The indicators G  and ∞G  coincide if and only if the state of 
the economy satisfies a “perfection” condition ( KβαQSR /)-(=/ 0 ) with respect to a 
constant-consumption criterion (Bazhanov 2010, Eq. (6)). 
On the other hand, the indicator ∞G  does not reflect CUC and current level of utility. As a 
result, a positive value of this indicator may “approve” a sharp decline in the current rate of the 
resource extraction, which may lead to a drop in the level of utility below a subsistence minimum, 
violating intergenerational justice. Of course, unsustainability of an economy ( 0<∞G ) calls for 
increases in investments into man-made and human capital and decreases in the rates of natural 
resource extraction to increase ,∞G  which requires 1) to define the maximum value of ∞G  for 
an optimal growth; and 2) the optimal path of acceptable sacrifices in current utility for future 
sustainable development. 
5. Conclusions 
This paper examined the effects of unaccounted inefficiencies on credibility of 
sustainability indicators and efficacy of investment. The results imply that, for sustainability of real 
economies, 1) changes in institutions may be more important than investment into man-made 
                                                        
29 This definition, offered in Bazhanov (2011), is partly equivalent to the following definition of Pezzey 
(2004): an economy is sustainable at time ,0t  if max0 ≤)( UtU  (the economy is not overconsuming at 
0t ), where maxU  is the maximum sustainable level of utility that can be maintained forever, given the 
stocks of man-made and natural capital at .0t  The equivalence is only partial because, as Pezzey noted, 
his definition works only for efficient economies. An overextracting inefficient economy may be 
underconsuming due to inefficient use of the resource. For such an economy, a sustainable program may 
not exist; therefore, for sustainability evaluation of real economies, it is preferable to use the tools that can 
work under inefficiencies since real economies are, as a rule, inefficient. 
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capital when the level of inefficiency is high; and 2) it is preferable that a resource policy is more 
conservative than is prescribed by a theory. In the latter conclusion, an overly conservative 
resource policy may result in dynamic inefficiency, but with updates in knowledge, the policy can 
be corrected, and the economy can be asymptotically efficient. 
Besides the influence of disregarded inefficiencies, an indicator that is linked to CUC may 
not reflect sustainability, because, by construction, this indicator does not show the change in the 
long-term ability of the economy to maintain non-decreasing utility. However, the use of an 
indicator that shows this change may increase a long-term welfare at the cost of an unacceptable 
fall in the current utility, violating the principles of sustainability and intergenerational justice. 
Hence, various forms of indicators may complement each other in sustainability evaluation. 
Alternatively, another indicator that is consistent with a criterion of intergenerational justice at any 
moment in time can be constructed. 
Despite all the difficulties with the use of indicator GI, the algorithm of its calculation 
undoubtedly provides useful information for policymakers by showing changes in factors that 
influence social welfare and sustainability. Apparently, the development of knowledge will further 
improve gathering this information and its use for sustainability policies. 
Appendix A. Proof of Lemma 1 
Since optimal paths are always efficient, a necessary condition of dynamic efficiency for 
economy (2)-(5) can be obtained from optimality conditions, e. g., in the problem of PV-
maximization30 of ∫
∞
0 2
)(),( dttπDCU  with a discount factor ).(tπ  The Hamiltonian of this 
                                                        
30 The maximin, formulated as ),(=≡max∫
∞
0
-
,
CRconstUdteδU tδ
CR
 with the additional constraint 
,=),( 2 UDCU  yields the same result (Leonard and Long (1992, 300–304)). 
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problem is ),-(+)---(+)(),(= 432 RDμDKδCFμtπDCUH SK 31 and the Pontryagin-type 
necessary conditions are 
CH = ,0=-)( KC μtπU  (A.1) 
RH = ,0=- SRK μFμ  (A.2) 
Kμ = ),-(-=∂/∂- δFμKH KK  (A.3) 
Sμ = XDUtπSH D ∂/∂)({-=∂/∂- 22   
 .∂/∂-∂/∂)}∂/∂-∂/∂(+ 4311 SDμSXXDXDFμ SDK  (A.4) 
Eq. (A.4) with Kμ  from (A.1) becomes 
Sμ = .∂
∂
-
∂
∂
)}
∂
∂
-
∂
∂
()(+
∂
∂
)({- 4312
12 S
D
μ
S
X
X
D
X
D
FtπU
X
D
Utπ SDCD  (A.5) 
The time derivative of (A.2) is ,+= RKRKS FμFμμ   which, combined with (A.5), gives 
.
∂
∂
-
∂
∂
}])
∂
∂
-
∂
∂
(+
∂
∂
)[(-{=+ 4312
12 S
D
μ
S
X
X
D
X
D
FU
X
D
UtπFμFμ SDCDRKRK   
The last equation, after dividing through by RF  and substitutions for Kμ  from (A.3) and 
Sμ  from (A.2), becomes 
,
∂
∂
-
∂
∂
}])
∂
∂
-
∂
∂
(+
∂
∂
[
)(
-{=)--(- 4312
12 S
D
μ
S
X
X
D
X
D
FU
X
D
U
F
tπ
F
F
δFμ KDCD
RR
R
KK

 
which, divided through by Kμ  with substitution for )(= tπUμ CK  from (A.1), yields 
),(+-=/ DτδFFF KRR  where )(Dτ  is defined by (7)■ 
                                                        
31 Here and below, Kμ  and Sμ  are indexed dual variables for capital and resource stock unlike 
,,,,,
2 KDCRC FUUHH  and ,RF  which are the partial derivatives of ,,UH  and .F  
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Appendix B. Proof of Proposition 1 
The proof follows the approach of Hamilton and Hartwick (2005, Proposition 1), which was 
first applied in Hartwick (1977). The differences are that the current proof uses: 1) utility as a 
measure of well-being (due to the distortion 2D ); 2) a modified HR to substitute for RF  instead 
of the standard HR (1). Namely, differentiation of Eq. (4) using Eqs. (2) and (6) gives 
[ ] .-+/)(--)+-(-)-(=
-+---++=---++=
31
3131
1
11
DFDdtRFdKRFτδFKδF
FRFRDKKδFDFRFKDKKδFDFRFKC
DRRKK
RRDRKDRK


 
A planner uses the indicator GI for the undistorted model: .-=0 RRFKG   Then 
.--+-= 31
00
1
RFτDFDGvGC RD        (B.1) 
 
By assumptions, RX =  and .3,2,1=,∂/∂= iXDXD ii   Then, by Lemma 1, 
.∂/∂}-/+{-)∂/∂-Ψ(= 3214 21 SXDUUDFDSDRFRFτ CDDIRR
  
 
Substitution of this expression into (B.1) results in 
,∂/∂)/(+)∂/∂+1)(-(+)∂/∂-Ψ(--=
21 2314
00 SXUUDSXDFDSDRFGvGC CDDIR   
which, after substitution into ,+= 22 DUCUU DC   yields 
).∂/∂+1(+)]∂/∂+1)(-(-)∂/∂-Ψ(--[=
21 2134
00 SXUDSXFDDSDRFGvGUU DDIRC 
 
The use of the definition of UΨ  results in Eq. (9) of the proposition. 
When economy (2)-(5) is dynamically efficient ( 0=ΨI ) and the present value prices of 
utility, capital, and the resource are defined as ,),( Kμtπ  and Sμ  in Lemma 1, Eq. (9) can be 
obtained from the result of Dixit et al. (1980, Theorem 1) or from a generalization of this result in 
Hamilton and Withagen (2007). Namely, these results claim that 
( ),+-=)( SμKμ
dt
d
Utπ SK   
which, using Eqs. (A.1)-(A.3), can be rewritten as follows: 
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( )[ ] ( )[ ]
[ ] ( ) ( )[ ].--=+/-=-=
+-=/+-=)(
GGδFμGμμGμGμ
dt
d
SFKμ
dt
d
μμSKμ
dt
d
Utπ
KKKKKK
RKKSK


 
Then, with the use of (A.1) and the notation ,-=: δFv K  it becomes ,)/-(= CGUGGvU   
which is Eq. (9) for 0=ΨU ■ 
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